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In this paper, we investigate the long-standing gap of quantum key rate between the Weak Co-
herent Pulse (WCP) and Heralded Single Photon Sources(HSPS) implementation of quantum cryp-
tographical protocol. We prove that, by utilizing the Heralded Pair Coherent State (HPCS) photon
sources, such a gap can be actually filled in both BB84 and SARG quantum key distribution. Thus,
a universal photon source which achieves the up-to-date optimal key rate for each transmission
distance is obtained.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)[1, 2] is a powerful
tool which allows two remote partners, Alice and Bob, to
establish random and private keys with an unconditional
security. However, the unavoidable quantum channel im-
perfections, such as the high loss of transmission line and
the dark counts of single photon detectors, impose severe
limitations on both key generation rate and transmission
distance of the practical quantum cryptographical appli-
cations.
Recently, to give a solution to these problems, much
effort has been focused on both cryptography protocol
itself and experimental configuration to give a further
improvement of the performance of the state-of-art quan-
tum cryptography system. This includes: (1)decoy state
method where several coherent state with different in-
tensities are used[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]; (2)searching for
more efficient information reconciliation and privacy am-
plification protocol[10]; (3)using spatial freedom of single
photon[11] or by utilizing entanglement photon pairs to
transfer more than 1 bit of information[12, 13]; (4)explor-
ing more efficient photon number distribution sources to
generate a higher secure key rate[14, 15, 16, 17], and
more experimentally, (5)applying the high-speed signal
modulation and single photon detection[18, 19].
Of these efforts, the most efficient and prominent
method is to bring (2) and (4) together, i.e., to use de-
coy state technology and explore its application in dif-
ferent kinds of photon source models. In Ref.[14], N.
Lu¨tkenhaus gave a proposal of the superiority of the
HSPS photon sources in implementing QKD protocols.
Later, following this seminar work, a lot of work has
been done to bring such a topic into a much wider
collection of variations[15, 20, 21]. It is shown by T.
Horikiri et al that the key rate can be improved with a
HSPS sources and the secure distance can be prolonged
from 140km to 170km for BB84 quantum cryptographi-
cal protocol[15]. Enlightened by such an observation, we
gave a further consideration of the Scarani-Ac´ın-Ribordy-
Gisin(SARG)[22] protocol and proved that such a en-
hancement from 95km to 120 km for SARG in the trans-
mission distance can also been obtained [21].
However, behind all these improvement in QKD prac-
tical implementation, there exist a long-standing prob-
lem that has not been addressed. That is the so-
called gap of secure key rate between WCP and HSPS
implementations of quantum cryptographical schemes.
As is shown in Ref.[21], it is shown that there ex-
ists a threshold distance of 136km for BB84 (93km for
SARG) beyond which the secret key rate is only en-
hanced and thus, the distance is greatly prolonged. How-
ever, within such a threshold distance, HSPS+BB84
(HSPS+SARG)has a less secure key generating rate than
WCP+BB84(WCP+SARG). Put simply, to optimize the
final performance, one should resort to WCP sources
within the threshold distance but resort to HSPS sources
if the distance is threshold-beyond.
In commercialization of QKD, it is important to find
a universal photon-emitting sources which is the opti-
mal in secure key generating rate for each transmission
distance. Then, a question that naturally arises is that
whether there exists a universal photon sources for QKD
applications. In this paper we give a proof that the an-
swer is actually affirmative.
Our derivation will be given by investigating the per-
formance of Heralded Pair Coherent State (HPCS) and
the corresponding Decoy State method. In this follow-
ing, we will first start by introducing the famous GLLP
formula for key generating rate and also the decoy state
method. Then, we will move our attention to the decoy
state implementation of BB84 and SARG protocol with
HPCS sources. Finally, to obtain our conclusion, we give
a numerical simulation with the same experiment param-
eters taken from [23] as in Ref.[6, 15, 21].
Different from any classical key distributing protocol,
the QKD protocol, such as BB84 and SARG, bases on
its unconditional security on the fundaments of quantum
physics. However, the security proof of these kind of pro-
tocol has not been obtained until many years after their
inventions[24]. The first simple proof of the single pho-
ton key rate for BB84 is given by Shor and Preskill[25].
This proof is then further extended to explicitly accom-
modate the imperfections in practical devices, e.g., the
2laser sources which occasionally emits multi-photon sig-
nals in each emitting. It is shown that the secure key
rate for imperfect laser sources can be given by[26]:
RBB84 ≥ −Qµf(Eµ)H(Eµ) +Q1[1−H(e1)], (1)
where Qµ is the Gain (the ratio of the number of Bob’s
detector counts to the number of signals Alice emites
when they are using the same basis[5]) of Bob’s detec-
tor and Eµ is the bit error rate (QBER) of sift key
when the average photon number of the laser source is µ.
H(x) = −xlog2x− (1−x)log2(1−x) is the Binary Shan-
non function. The function f(Eµ) is the efficiency of key
reconciliation and is often assumed to be an constant 1.22
for simplicity[6]. Q1, e1 is the corresponding gain and er-
ror rate contributed by single-photon proportion of the
laser source.
In the rest of our paper, we will give a thorough anal-
ysis of both BB84 and SARG protocol. So, it is now
convenient to introduce the secure consideration relevant
to SARG protocol. For SARG protocol, it is known that
the security key rate RBB84 contains the contribution of
both single-photon and two-photon pulses[6, 27]
RSARG ≥ −Qµf(Eµ)H(Eµ) +Q1[1−H(g(e1))]
+ Q2 [1−H(h(ep,2))] (2)
in which ep,2 = e2 is the phase shift error rate contributed
by double-photon pulses and g(·), h(·) are functions that
can be obtained in the Appendix of Ref. [6].
In effect, the average gain Qµ of laser and the error
rate Eµ can be directly observed in experiments. To de-
rive the unconditional secure key rate in Eq. (1) and
Eq. (2), what one is required to do is only to give an
accurate estimation of Q1, e1, Q2, e2. However, due to
strong channel loss and all kinds of potential and pow-
erful attacks by eavesdroppers, to obtained the required
estimation is not a trivial. Fortunately, one can apply
the decoy state method and continue our derivation.
The main core of decoy state [3, 4, 5, 7] is to replace
the single intensity laser sources with signal states and
decoys states which are generated respectively by lasers
with different intensities. If the signal state and the de-
coy state have the same wavelength, timing, and many
other physical characters, no eavesdropper will be able
to distinguish a decoy state from a signal state success-
fully. Thus the condition probability that Bob’s detec-
tor clicks when a n-photon pulse is emitted from Al-
ice will be the same for signal state and decoy state.
If we use Yn to denote such a probability, we have
Yn(signal) = Yn(decoy) = Yn and the error rate of n-
photon pulse reads en(signal) = en(decoy) = en.
Typically, if we denote the intensity of signal state by
µ, the decoy state by ν1, ν2, · · · , νk( Here we assume, k
different decoy state are involved.), by averaging over all
the possible n-photon pulses, one can obtain that the
overall gain Qµ, Qνk and over error EQµ, EQνk follows
Qµ =
∑
n
YnP (µ, n), Qνk =
∑
n
YnP (νk, n), (3)
EQµ =
∑
n
enYnP (µ, n), EQνk =
∑
n
enYnP (νk, n),(4)
where P (µ, n) is the probability that the pulse con-
tains n photon. Eµ, Eν can be obtained by Eµ =
EQµ/Qµ, Eνk = EQνk/Qνk .
The laser sources that will be utilized in encoding of
BB84 or SARG quantum signal is Heralded Pair Coher-
ent State(HPCS). In fact, the Pair Coherent State(PCS),
which is originally proposed by G. S. Agarwal[28], is in
essence another kind of photo-number correlated state.
But we will see that its correlation is quite powerful and
could induce a fundamental improvement compared with
the HSPS state. According to Ref.[16, 28], the PCS is a
two-mode correlated coherent and can be written in the
Fock basis
|µ〉〉 = 1√
I0(2|µ|)
∞∑
n=0
|n〉1|n〉2, (5)
where µ ∈ C and I0(·) is the modified Bessel’s function
of the first kind. Interestingly, by tracing over arbitrary
one of the two modes, the photon number distribution
follows ρ1 = Tr2[|µ〉〉〈〈µ|] = 1I0(2µ)
∑
n
µ2n
n! |n〉〈n|, which
demonstrates a sub-poissonian statistics. To decrease the
potential multi-photon pulses, we consider the photon
heralding technique. After the generation, one mode of
the PCS state is sent to a trigger detector (only distin-
guish click and non-click), and the other one is sent to the
Alice’s encoding module. Only when the trigger detector
clicks, will the laser signal be deemed to have been sent
to Bob. Therefore, when we consider the the probability
that n-photon pulse is emitted form Alice enclave, the
quantum detection efficiency ηA and also the dark count
rate dA should be included[15]:
P (µ, n) =
1
I0(2µ)
µ2n
(n!)2
[1− (1− ηA)n + dA] . (6)
With the photon distribution in Eq. (6), we will be
able to give a general theory of decoy state method for
HPCS-based quantum key distribution schemes. The de-
coy state method we present here is practical in the sense
that we can fulfill such a task by only a finite different
number of signal state and decoy state. In fact, it will
be shown that only one signal state µ and two decoy
state ν1, ν2(1 > µ > ν1 > ν2 and ν
2
1 + ν
2
2 ≤ µ2) will be
enough to give an estimation. First of all, it is sufficient
to use only ν1, ν2 and obtain the estimation of Y1 and e1.
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FIG. 1: Comparison rate of HPCS+BB84 protocol with dif-
ferent photon number distribution, ηA = 0.6, dA = 5× 10
−8.
For HSPS+BB84 sources, threshold distance is 136 km. The
secret rate is optimal for each transmission distance.
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FIG. 2: Comparison rate of HPCS+SARG protocol with dif-
ferent photon number distribution, ηA = 0.6, dA = 5× 10
−8.
For HSPS+SARG sources, threshold distance is 93 km. The
secret rate has been optimized .
Plugging Eq. (6) into Eq.(3), one gets
Qν1 =
∑
n
Yn
1
I0(2ν1)
ν2n1
(n!)2
[1− (1 − ηA)n + dA] (7)
Qν2 =
∑
n
Yn
1
I0(2ν2)
ν2n2
(n!)2
[1− (1 − ηA)n + dA] (8)
Form I0(2ν1)×Qν1 − I0(2ν2)×Qν2 , we have
I0(2ν1)Qν1 − I0(2ν2)Qν2
= Y1(ηA + dA) +
∑
n≥2
Yn
ν2n1 − ν2n2
(n!)2
[1− (1 − ηA)n + dA]
≤ Y1(ηA + dA) + ν
4
1 − ν42
µ4
∑
n≥2
Yn
µ2n
(n!)2
[1− (1− ηA)n + dA] ,
where in last line we have applied the relation ν2n1 −ν2n2 ≤
(ν41−ν42)µ2n−4 for any n ≥ 2. The lower bound for single
photon gain Y1 can be obtained:
Y1 ≥ Y U,ν1,ν21
=
I0(2ν1)Qν1 − I0(2ν2)Qν2 − ν
4
1
−ν4
2
µ4
(I0(2µ)Qµ − dAY0)
(ηA + dA)
[
(ν21 − ν22)− ν
4
1
−ν4
2
µ2
] .(9)
Using a similar way, from I0(2ν1) × EQν1 − I0(2ν2) ×
EQν2 , we have
e1 ≤ eU,ν1,ν21 =
I0(2ν1)EQν1 − I0(2ν2)EQν2
(ηA + dA)Y L1 (ν
2
1 − ν22 )
. (10)
Furthermore, to derive the two-photon gain Y2 and bit
error rate e2, one need the help of the gain rate for signal
state Qµ:
Qµ =
∑
n
Yn
1
I0(2µ)
µ2n
(n!)2
[1− (1 − ηA)n + dA]
=
n=2∑
n=0
Yn
1
I0(2µ)
µ2n
(n!)2
[1− (1− ηA)n + dA]
+
n=∞∑
n=3
Yn
1
I0(2µ)
µ2n
(n!)2
[1− (1− ηA)n + dA] .(11)
With some frustrating algebra manipulation, the two-
photon gain and two-photon error rate can be given by
Y2 ≥ Y2Est
=
2
[1− (1− ηA)2 + dA][(a2 − b2)− a3−b3c ]
[I0(2ν1)Qν1 − I0(2ν2)Qν2 −
a3 − b3
c3
I0(2µ)Qµ +
+Y0dA
a3 − b3
c3
− Y1ηA[(a− b)− a
3 − b3
c2
]]. (12)
e2 < e2
Est =
ν22I0(2ν1)EQν1 − ν21I0(2ν2)EQν2 + 12 (ν21 − ν22)Y0dA
Y2[1− (1− ηA)2 + dA]ν21ν22 (ν21 − ν22 )
. (13)
Now let’s give some numerical simulation with the ex- perimental parameters taken from Ref.[23]. To move on,
4we use the Qµ, EQµ in the ideal scenario to replace the
actual experiment and investigate the limitations of the
key generation rate with HPCS. In precise, for a n-photon
pulse which is not disturbed by eavesdropper, the expec-
tation values of yields and bit error rate can be respec-
tively evaluated[6]. For BB84:
Yn,BB84 = [ηn + (1 − ηn)pdark] /2, (14)
en,BB84 =
ηn
edet
2 + (1− ηn)pdark 14
Yn,BB84
, (15)
and for SARG:
Yn,SARG = ηn
(
edet
2
+
1
4
)
+ (1− ηn) pdark 1
2
, (16)
en,SARG =
ηn
edet
2 + (1− ηn)pdark 14
Yn,SARG
, (17)
where pdark is the dark count Bob’s detector and
edet stands for the misalignment of the optical instru-
ment. ηn = 1 − (1 − η)n and η denotes the total trans-
mittance of quantum channel and Bob’s enclaves.
Substituting Eqs. (14)(15) and Eq.(6) into Eqs. (3)(4),
we get Qµ,BB84 =
1
2ξ − (1 − pdark)ζ, EQµ,BB84 =
edet
2 ξ −
(
edet
2 − pdark4
)
ζ, Eµ,BB84 = EQµ,BB84/Qµ,BB84.
Similarly, for SARG protocol, we obtain Qµ,SARG =(
edet
2 +
1
4
)
ξ − ( edet2 + 14 − pdark2 ) ζ, EQµ,SARG = edet2 ξ −(
edet
2 − pdark4
)
ζ, Eµ,SARG = EQµ,SARG/Q
,
µ,SARG where
ξ = 1 + dA − I0(2µ
√
1−ηA)
I0(2µ)
, ζ = (1 + dA)
I0(2µ
√
1−η)
I0(2µ)
−
I0(2µ
√
(1−η)(1−ηA))
I0(2µ)
.
This ideal scenario is a good indication of the limi-
tation of the performance of secure key rate. To see
this, the single error e1 and Q1 is obtained directly from
Eq.(15) and Eq.(17). The parameters for trigger detec-
tor are ηA = 0.6, dA = 5 × 10−8 as the ones chosen in
Ref. [15]. The average photon number for signal state
µ is optimized for each transmittance distance. As is
shown in Fig .1, the original threshold distance for BB84
at 136km, doesn’t exist for HPCS state and an average
gain of 1.5 in key generating rate can be observed. Fig.
2, the SARG protocol within different implementation of
photon sources is depicted. Comparison with the BB84,
the average gain is much more prominent, which is about
3.4 times than ever before.
In summary, by investigating the sub-possion photon
sources, we show the gap of secrete key rate between the
WCP and HSPS implementations can be actually filled.
For the Heralded Pair Coherent State, the threshold dis-
tance does not exist and can be considered as a conve-
nient and universal photon surces in QKD commercial-
izations. However, we note that here, to look for a con-
venient and efficient photon sources is still an open an
important question for the future robust and high speed
QKD application.
After finishing our task we are aware that, more Re-
cently, the generation of pair coherent state has also been
addressed in Ref[29].
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